Skip to content
article 5 min read

Are SMS codes good enough for MFA?

Text message codes beat a password alone, but they are the weakest kind of MFA. How they fail, and how to move important accounts off them.

It depends what you compare them with. Next to a password on its own, a code sent by text message is a large improvement. Next to an authenticator app or a passkey, it is the weakest choice on offer. The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) says so in its small business handbook: codes sent by SMS or email are the least secure option.

For how SMS sits among the other kinds of MFA, see our lesson Multi-factor authentication: what it is and where to start.

What SMS codes do well

They stop the commonest attack, which is software trying stolen passwords in bulk. In a year-long study published in 2019, Google and researchers from two US universities found that an SMS code sent to a recovery phone blocked 100% of automated bots, 96% of bulk phishing attacks and 76% of targeted attacks.

They also need no app and work on any mobile phone. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is clear that any form of MFA is better than none. If a text message is the only second step a service offers, turn it on.

Three ways a text message code fails

Your number is moved to someone else’s SIM. The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) describes two versions. In an unauthorised port, a criminal opens an account with a different telco in your name and transfers your number to it. In a SIM swap, they persuade your own telco to move the number to a SIM card they hold. Either way, your codes now arrive on their phone, which ACMA says can get them into your bank, email and social media accounts.

Australian telcos are required to confirm a customer’s identity before porting a number or swapping a SIM. The checks do not always happen. In September 2026 Telstra paid a $277,200 penalty after ACMA found it had not carried out the required identity checks in 15 unauthorised SIM swaps during 2025. ACMA said it was the seventh action in its crackdown on mobile number fraud, with penalties passing $5 million in total. The weak point here is a telco’s frontline staff, and no setting on your side changes that.

The message is read on the way. Text messages are not encrypted. CISA notes that someone with access to a telecommunications provider’s network can read them, and that weaknesses in the signalling system phone networks use have been exploited to obtain codes. For most small businesses this is the least likely of the three. CISA’s strongest warning against SMS was written for senior officials and other highly targeted people.

You type the code into a fake page. A phishing email leads to a copy of a real sign-in page. You enter the password, the real site sends the code, and you enter that too. The criminal now has both, and uses them straight away. Google’s study shows a page built to do this. Codes from an authenticator app can be stolen the same way, so switching to an app fixes the first two problems and leaves this one.

How the alternatives compare

  • Authenticator app. The code is generated on the phone and never travels over the phone network, so a stolen number or an intercepted message gets the criminal nothing. CISA calls app codes, or an app prompt that asks you to match a number, the best options for a small or medium business that cannot yet move to something stronger.
  • Passkey. There is no code. The passkey is tied to the real website, so it will not work on a copy. ASD says passkeys stop criminals tricking you into signing in to a fake site, and Microsoft describes passkeys synced through an Apple or Google account as a convenient, low-cost replacement for SMS and authenticator apps.
  • Physical security key. A passkey on a small device of its own. Microsoft recommends security keys for people with administrator-level access.

Where SMS is still acceptable

Three cases: the service offers nothing else, the account holds little of value, or you are part way through moving to something better. CISA accepts SMS as a temporary measure and a last resort. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) takes a similar line. It classes codes sent over the phone network as a restricted method, which means a service that uses them must also offer an alternative, warn users about the risk, and have a plan to move away.

Moving the important accounts off SMS

  1. List the accounts that send a text message code. Put email, the Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace administrator, banking, accounting and the domain name at the top.
  2. For each one, add a passkey if the service offers it, or an authenticator app if it does not.
  3. Go back and remove the phone number as a sign-in method. CISA points out that adding an app does not switch SMS off, and the old method stays behind as a weaker way in.
  4. Check how account recovery works. Some services fall back to a text message when you say you are locked out, and it is not always possible to turn that off. Know which ones.
  5. Ask your telco what extra protection it can place on the mobile account, such as a PIN that must be given before a number is moved.
  6. Tell staff the warning sign. If a phone that normally has reception shows SOS only, or stops receiving calls and messages, ACMA’s advice is to contact the telco immediately, then the bank.

Whatever the method, the fake sign-in page relies on someone not noticing it. Our lesson on how to spot a phishing email covers what to look for. If you would like passkeys and authenticator apps rolled out across the business, and SMS switched off where it can be, that is part of Identity & Access Management.

Sources

  1. Securing accounts and identities, Small business cyber security handbook (Australian Signals Directorate) cyber.gov.au
  2. What to do if your mobile number has been stolen (ACMA) acma.gov.au
  3. Telstra pays $277K after consumer fraud losses (ACMA) acma.gov.au
  4. New research: How effective is basic account hygiene at preventing hijacking (Google Security Blog) security.googleblog.com
  5. Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA (CISA) cisa.gov
  6. Mobile Communications Best Practice Guidance (CISA) cisa.gov
  7. SP 800-63B-4: Digital Identity Guidelines, Authentication and Authenticator Management (NIST) pages.nist.gov
  8. Use passkeys, Personal cyber security handbook (Australian Signals Directorate) cyber.gov.au
  9. Passkeys (FIDO2) authentication method in Microsoft Entra ID (Microsoft Learn) learn.microsoft.com

Published by Only Tech Solutions.

This is general information, not advice for your situation. See the terms and conditions.

We can sort this for you

More articles

All articles

Tell us what needs sorting.

Book a call or send an email. We reply within one business day.